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  Why do some countries industrialize later than others? Recent literature 
suggests that the prime reason is low agricultural productivity. This paper 
argues that the initial inequality of human capital could also be a contributing 
factor to the delayed process of industrialization characterizing some countries. 
We develop a neo-classical growth model which predicts that countries with a 
greater initial knowledge gap between rich and poor agents industrialize slowly, 
and that human capital inequality, although declining, tends to be persistent. 
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1. Introduction
What determines the stage and pace of industrialization is a highly debatable topic in
the macro development literature. In a recent paper, Gollin et al. (2002) highlight the
role of agricultural productivity in the process of industrialization. The key point
made in their paper is that most of the late industrializing countries began the process
of industrialization late because of low agricultural productivity. Their model shows
that only once the society produces the basic nutritional requirement of food, labor
starts moving from agriculture to industry. From that point onwards, agriculture loses
its importance asymptotically and a Solow technology is adopted in the long run.
Hansen and Prescott (1999) also reach similar conclusions. While all these papers
provide useful insights about the process of industrialization, they remain largely
silent about the evolution of within-country inequality during the course of
industrialization. 
The latter issue is important because of a recent wave of literature exploring
the evolution of inequality. There is now a near unanimity among growth economists
that growth and inequality are inversely correlated.
2 Thus one expects that as
countries industrialize, inequality should fall. A recent paper by Sala-i-Martin (2002)
indirectly corroborates this fact by documenting a decline in world inequality.
A parallel emerging literature, however, paints a different picture about the
course of inequality in the long run. A number of papers including Mookherjee and
Ray (2002), Banerjee and Newman (1993), Galore and Zeira (1993), and
Bandyopadhyay (1993) argue that a combination of credit market failure and initial
unequal distribution of human capital could make inequality a stable and persistent
phenomenon. Along similar lines, Solon (1992) and Zimmerman (1992) provide
estimates, which suggest that intergenerational mobility in the US is much lower than
expected. According to these findings, it is likely that the child of poor parents will
live in poverty. 
In this paper, we attempt to integrate the literature dealing with the process of
industrialization, and that dealing with the evolution of inequality. Our line of
research builds on models in the tradition of Banerjee and Newman (1993), and
Galore and Zeira (1993), where credit market imperfections may give rise to
persistent inequality. We construct an aggregative growth model, which lays out the
                                                          
2See for example, Castelló and Doménech (2001) for a recent estimate of growth-inequality
correlations.3
time path of knowledge inequality as a country industrializes. In particular, our model
extends Gollin et al.’s (2002) focusing both on the initial distribution of human capital
and agricultural productivity as two major determinants of the process of
industrialization and the resulting inequality. 
Rather than income inequality, our model focuses primarily on knowledge or
human capital inequality within a representative country in the world economy.
3 As in
Gollin et al. (2002) and Hansen and Prescott (1999), in our model, the process of
industrialization is perceived as the diminishing importance of agriculture, while all
residents of a country start adopting an industrial production technology. 
In our model, there are two types of altruistic agents: the poor who have a low
initial human capital, and the rich characterized by a high initial human capital. Due
to the initial distribution of human capital and to imperfectly functioning credit
markets, the poor cannot operate the industrial technology because they do not have
the minimum necessary skill. In this environment, there exists an optimal waiting time
(which we call belt-tightening time) for the poor to become entrepreneurs, and
therefore rich. 
Our calibrated model predicts that the process of industrialization will be
considerably slower in economies with a highly unequal initial distribution of human
capital and a low agricultural productivity. Quantitative exercises with the model also
suggest that as the poor grow, knowledge inequality declines and converges to a level
whose magnitude again depends on the state of agricultural productivity and the initial
distribution of human capital. The model thus rationalizes how a declining inequality
could be consistent with the emergence of a long run stable inequality. 
The rest of this paper is laid out as follows. In the section that follows, we
present some stylized facts aimed at motivating our theoretical analysis. In section 3
we lay out our theoretical model and its predictions regarding the relationship
between inequality and industrialization. Section 4 presents some quantitative
implications from the model and connects them to the stylized facts. Section 5
concludes. 
                                                          
3 See Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993), and Galor and Tsiddon (1997) for
alternative models where inequality stems from the distribution of human capital. Also note that since4
2. Some stylized facts 
In this section, we report some stylized facts about the time path and persistence of
human capital inequality, and the cross-country correlation between human capital
inequality, agricultural productivity, and the rate of industrialization. This exercise is
motivated by our hypothesis that a combination of agricultural productivity and initial
distribution of human capital may determine the pace of industrialization of countries. 
We measure the degree of industrialization of a country by its share of
agriculture in GDP. The agricultural productivity and share of agriculture to GDP data
are taken from the World Bank Development Indicators (2002)
4. Our measure of
human capital inequality is given by a human capital Gini coefficient, which refers to
the population aged 15 and over, and is calculated as in Castelló and Doménech
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where  H represents the average schooling years of the population aged 15 and over; i
and j stand for different levels of education; ni  and nj are the shares of population with
a given level of education; and  ˆi x and  ˆ j x are the cumulative average schooling years
of each educational level. Four levels of education are considered: no schooling,
primary, secondary, and higher education. 
We average our data over non-overlapping five-year periods, so that data
permitting, there are eight observations per country (1960-65, 1965-1970, 1970-75,
1976-80, 1981-85, 1986-90, 1991-95, 1996-99). We take five-year averages of all our
variables because the human capital inequality variables are only available at such
intervals. Our dataset is, therefore, a panel made up of 90 countries over 8 time
periods
5. A full list of the 90 countries can be found in Appendix 1.
Table 1 reports the cross-country average human capital Gini coefficient, and
the cross-country average share of agriculture for our eight time periods. These
numbers provide a broad measure of human capital inequality and the degree of
industrialization of a representative country in the world economy (based on our
                                                                                                                                                                     
human capital is the only reproducible input in our model, income inequality and knowledge inequality
are positively correlated in our setting.
4 The share of agriculture in GDP is calculated as the share of the value added coming from agriculture
to GDP. Agricultural productivity is given by the agriculture value added per worker.5
sample). The Table suggests that over our forty year time span, the knowledge
inequality among the citizens of the representative country has fallen as the country
has industrialized (as evident by a declining share of agriculture). It is noticeable,
however, that although inequality shows a declining trend, even after forty years, the
Gini coefficient remains quite high (about 36%)
6.
In the next step, we turn our attention to the persistence of within-country
knowledge inequality and to whether it differs across countries. The dynamic panel
regression reported in Table 2 shows that inequality appears to be a generally
persistent phenomenon. Furthermore, the fact that the coefficient associated with the
lagged dependent variable is higher for countries with lower agricultural productivity
suggests that this persistence is magnified in countries with lower agricultural
productivity
7.
Table 3 reports cross-country correlations between the time average of the
share of agriculture, the time average of the share of agricultural productivity, the
initial (start of period) inequality, and the terminal (end of period) inequality. It
appears from the Table that countries with higher initial inequality of human capital
have a higher share of agriculture (meaning a lower degree of industrialization).
Moreover, countries with low agricultural productivity also have a higher share of
agriculture. The initial and terminal Gini coefficients have a high correlation (0.88),
corroborating the persistence of inequality reported in Table 2.
The stylized facts that emerge from Tables 1 to 3 can be summarized as
follows: 
(i) The knowledge gap generally shows a world-wide decline over the
forty-year course of industrialization spanned by our data.
(ii) Inequality is a persistent process despite its overall decline. The
persistence is higher for countries with low average agricultural
productivity. 
(iii) Countries with higher human capital inequality and lower average
agricultural productivity are less industrialized. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
5 Note that the last time period only contains four years, namely 1996-99.
6 Adopting a more formal approach, we ran a fixed-effects regression of the Gini coefficient on a time
trend and found that the latter variable attracted a negative and statistically significant coefficient.
7  Note that because of first-differencing and using lagged variables as instruments in the GMM
specifications in Table 2, a number of observations is lost.6
In the section that follows, we develop a model, which attempts to explain these
stylized facts. 
3. The model
3.1 The basic framework
Production 
Consider a dual economy with two sectors: traditional (indexed a) and modern
(indexed m). The traditional sector (say, agriculture) produces output (food) with raw
labor (la), human capital (ha), and land. Since land is fixed in supply (normalized at
unit level), the traditional sector is subject to diminishing returns. The modern sector
produces output with raw labor (lm) and, human capital (hm). The technology in the
modern sector is subject to constant returns.
8 To start production in sector m, one
needs a minimum amount of human capital, hmin. The production functions in these
two sectors are therefore, 
(1) yat = z() at at lh
α    with  0<α<1;
(2) ymt= A ) ( mt h mt l     for  hmt  min h ≥
     =  0    otherwise,
where 0<α<1. lat.hat and lmthmt represent effective labor supplied in the traditional and
modern sectors respectively; and z and A are the total factor productivities (TFP) in
the two sectors. Raw labor is inelastically supplied, and lat and lmt are therefore
normalized at unit levels. 
Preferences 
Following Gollin et. al. (2002), the instantaneous utility function for both types of
agents is given by: 
(3) U(ca, cm) = ca
      when   
−
< ≤ a ca ω





                                                          
8 A linear Rebelo (1991) type technology in the modern sector is assumed to ensure self-sustained
growth. This means that growth in the modern sector is endogenous. Alternatively, one could have an
exogenously growing modern sector. The qualtitative and quantititative implications of the model
remain the same regardless of how growth is specified in the modern sector. 7
ca and cm denote consumption of agricultural (food) and manufacturing goods
respectively. 
−
a is a saturation level of consumption of food.
9 Until that level is
reached, all agents care about is food. Once that level is reached, agents do not derive
any more utility from additional food.
10 They then start caring about manufacturing
goods. Let ω be the minimum subsistence level of consumption below which the
agent fails to survive.
Agents are connected across generations by altruistic bequest motives. Thus,
they maximize the utility function, 






t c c U β , where β is the degree of altruism.
Initial distribution of human capital
There are two types of agents in this economy: type 1 and type 2. Type 1 agents own
) 1 (
0 h  units of human capital and 1 unit of land to start with, and Type 2 agents own
) 2 (
0 h  units of human capital and one unit of land. We assume: 
Assumption 1:  α / 1 ) 1 (
0 ] / [ z a h
−
<  and  min
) 1 (
0 h h <
Assumption 2:  ) 2 (
0 h α / 1




The implications of these two assumptions are that the initial distributions of
human capital are such that type 1 agents are poor and type 2 agents are rich in the
following sense. Type I agents’ initial human capital is not sufficient for them to
produce the saturation quantity of food, which means they prefer not to trade with the
rich
11. Nor is it enough to meet the basic skill of operating an industrial technology.
                                                          
9 We assume that 
−
a  is less than the initial start up cost of launching a modern enterprise,  min h .
10To avoid any discontinuity in the utility function, the logarithmic part of (4) should be written as
ln(ε+cm) where ε is very small number. This is equivalent to assuming that all agents have a small
endowment of manufacturing goods. As in Gollin et. al. (2002), we avoid this complication since all
the results in the paper would remain largely unaffected even if we introduced it. The decision rules
(26) and (45) would only change by a constant term involving ε. 
11 If  α / 1 ] / [ ) 1 (
0 z a h
−
> , then the poor can trade their surplus food with the rich. The poor have then two
options: trade with the rich for manufacturing goods or belt tighten and invest their surplus human
capital,  α / 1 ] / [ ) 1 (
0 z a h
−
− , in the education of their children, sacrificing the consumption of
manufacturing goods. Like in the model with no trade, an optimal belt-tightening time for the poor8
On the other hand, type 2 agents have just enough human capital to launch both
agricultural and industrial technologies. Following Assumption 2, hmin can be treated
as an initial inequality parameter. A higher hmin is, therefore, associated with a greater
initial inequality.
The population is constant and normalized in such a way that a fraction φ  is
made up of type 1 agents. It is assumed that credit markets are imperfect and that the
poor can therefore not access the credit markets to finance schooling and reach hmin
(see Appendix 2 for a justification of this issue).
Investment
There are two types of investment technologies for the creation of human capital. An
agent can invest in the traditional sector or in the modern sector. Investment in the
traditional sector can be thought of as educating one’s child in a village primary
school. Investment in the modern sector means sending one’s child to a big city for
secondary and more advanced education. Regardless of the form of schooling, the
child can become an entrepreneur only if he/she acquires the minimum skill hmin.
We thus have the following technology for updating human capital over
generations: 
(5) jt jt jt I h h = − − + ) 1 ( 1 δ , where j=a, m.
jt I  is the investment in sector j. If the adult does not invest in schooling, the child
only inherits a fraction (1-δ) of his/her parent’s human capital. Benabou (1996),
Mankiw et al. (1992), and Bandyopadhyay and Basu (2004) model the
intergenerational knowledge transfer process in a similar way.
Resource constraints
Since their initial human capital stock is lower than the start-up level of running a
modern enterprise, hmin, the poor produce food with the technology given by (1).
Since the poor produce less than 
−
a, they are not satiated with food, and therefore
prefer not to engage in trade with the rich for manufacturing goods. The markets for
agricultural and manufacturing goods thus fail to function due to the initial
                                                                                                                                                                     
exists for this scenario as well. All the quantitative implications reached in this paper change very little
if we allow trade between rich and the poor. The details of the working of this model with trade are
available upon request from the authors.9
distribution of human capital. The poor invest  ) 1 (
at I  in agriculture, and face the
following resource constraints:
(6) y I c at at at
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( = + ,
(7)
(1) (1) (1)
1 (1 ) at at at hh I δ + −− = .
Combining (1), (6), and (7), we get the sequential resource constraint for the poor:
(8)
(1) (1) (1) (1)
1 (1 ) at at at at ch hz h
α δ + +− − =
The rich, on the other hand, produce food and manufacturing goods as they
can operate both technologies (1) and (2). Because of the utility function (3), the rich
just consume 
−
a units of food. They will not produce food in excess of 
−
a because that
would be wasteful, as they would neither want to consume that surplus food, nor be
able to trade it with the poor for manufacturing goods, since the poor do not produce
the latter. 
At any date t, the rich first allocate their human capital between the traditional
and modern sectors. They produce  ) 2 (
at y  units of food and  ) 2 (
mt y  units of
manufacturing goods. They then invest  ) 2 (
mt I  of their human capital in the modern
sector and  ) 2 (




at mt t hhh +=,
(10) ) 2 ( ) 2 (
at at y I a = +
−
,
(11) Iat hat hat
) 2 ( ) 2 ( ) 1 ( ) 2 (
1 = − − + δ ,
(12) ) 2 ( ) 2 ( ) 2 (
mt mt mt y I c = + ,
(13) Imt hmt hmt
) 2 ( ) 2 ( ) 1 ( ) 2 (
1 = − − + δ ,
Using (2) and (9) through (13), one obtains the following sequential resource
constraint of the rich: 
(14) hat z mt Ah ht ht mt c a α δ ) 2 ( ) 2 ( ) 2 ( ) 1 ( ) 2 (
1
) 2 ( + = − − + + + ,10
3.2. Growth of the rich
The rich cannot employ the poor in their manufacturing firms because the poor do not
have the basic skill hmin to work there. They therefore invest in the traditional sector
just enough to produce 
−
a units of food.
12 The rich will, therefore, allocate a constant
amount 
) 2 ( ~
a h of human capital to agriculture, which is sufficient for them to produce









Using (2), (9), (12), and (15), one obtains:
(16)
−
+ − = − − + M Ah h h c t t t mt
) 2 ( ) 2 ( ) 2 (
1
) 2 ( ) 1 ( δ ,
where 
) 2 ( ~
) ( a h A M δ − =
−
.
The rich thus maximize (4) subject to (16). 
13
Given this structure, we have the following proposition: 
Proposition 1: For a sufficiently large  min h  (meaning  min h>
) 2 ( ~
a h ), the human
capital of the rich grows and reaches an asymptotic rate, β[1+A-δ]. 












where  δ − + = 1 A B .
Plugging (16) into (17), we obtain the following second-order difference equation in
) 2 (
t h :
(18) ) 1 ( ) 1 (
) 2 ( 2 ) 2 (
1
) 2 (
2 − = + + −
−
+ + B M h B h B h t t t β β β  
                                                          
12 The rich can sustain this saturation level of food production in two alternative ways: by employing
the poor, training them to acquire the skill level, 
) 2 ( ~
a h so that they can produce 
−
a  units of food for
them; or by training their own offspring to acquire the same knowledge to be self-sufficient in the
production of food in their backyards. (Once that basic skill of producing food is reached, the rich can
then train their children to acquire the basic skill to be entrepreneurs, hmin.) We will see later that it will
not be optimal for the poor to be employed by the rich to produce food in their backyard.
13 One could ask why the rich do not incur the training cost λhmin and train the poor to be entrepreneurs.
A quick look at the budget constraint (16) of the rich reveals that it is suboptimal to do so because the11
The general solution to this difference equation is given by: 
(19) () ( )





t h B A B A h + + = β ,
where A1 and A2 are determined by the initial and terminal conditions.
14 The initial
condition is characterized by  . min h  The terminal condition is given by the














We next show that the TVC requires that A1 in (19) must equal to zero. We prove this
by contradiction. If not, then  ) 2 (
t h  grows at the rate B because B>βB. On the other
hand, 
(2)
mt c  grows at the rate βB as in (20). Thus the right hand side of (20) inside the


























which does not converge to zero as T approaches infinity. Consequently, the TVC is
violated if  ) 2 (
t h  grows at the rate B.
We have thus established that the optimal solution for  ) 2 (
t h  must be:
(22) ()





t h B A h + = β ,
where A2 is characterized by the initial stock of human capital as follows: 
(23)
) 2 ( ~
min 2 a h h A − =  
As long as 
) 2 ( ~
min a h h > , human capital in the modern sector will grow and eventually
reach an asymptotic rate βB. Q.E.D.
                                                                                                                                                                     
right hand side would be reduced by this constant training cost thus resulting in a lower life time utility
for the rich.
14 See Appendix 3 for a derivation of Equation (19).12
In order to grow, the rich must have initial human capital in excess of the
amount necessary to sustain the agricultural production 
−
a. This explains why
min h must exceed 
) 2 ( ~
a h .
3.3 A belt-tightening strategy for the poor
What conditions will ensure that the poor become entrepreneurs someday? In order to
be entrepreneurs, the poor have to reach the minimum human capital,  min h . They
therefore have the option to follow a belt-tightening strategy of consuming just the
subsistence level, ω, for several generations, and accumulate human capital until they
reach the  min h  units of human capital necessary for them to become entrepreneurs. We
make two technological assumptions concerning  min h :
Assumption 3: 
) 2 ( ~
min a h h > , where 
) 2 ( ~ ) 2 ( ~
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Assumption 3 specifies that hmin should be sufficiently large to preclude the possibility
of the poor acquiring the basic skill of being entrepreneurs just by being employed by
the rich for producing food in their backyard. Similarly, Assumption 4 stipulates that
hmin  should be sufficiently large to rule out the possibility of the poor becoming
entrepreneurs simply by growing the optimal quantity of food in their own
backyard.
15 
We now analyze what makes this belt-tightening strategy feasible. We have
the following Lemma. 
Lemma 1:  Let the poor set the consumption plan:  ω = cat
) 1 ( . For sufficiently large
values of 
) 1 (
0 h and/or z, or for a sufficiently small hmin, such a belt tightening strategy is
feasible. 
Proof: For  ω = cat
) 1 ( , the time path of the human capital of the poor is given by the
following difference equation: 
(24) ω δ
α
− − + = +
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (
1 ) 1 ( at at at h zh h .
                                                          
15 This will be made clear in Lemma 2.   13









0  and 
~
min h h < , the poor can become entrepreneurs
16. Q.E.D. 
We hereafter assume that the feasibility conditions set forth in Lemma 1 for
the poor to become entrepreneurs hold. We next pose the question: given that the belt-
tightening strategy is feasible, is it optimal for the poor to follow such a strategy? We
answer this question in two steps. First, we determine the value function of the poor if
they do not become entrepreneurs ( NE V ). Next, we determine the corresponding
value function if they do become entrepreneurs by following a belt-tightening strategy
( E V ). Comparing  NE V  with  E V , we determine an optimal belt tightening time for the
poor to transform themselves. 
The following lemma characterizes  NE V . 
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Proof: If they cannot be entrepreneurs, the poor have two options: 
(a) work for the rich in their backyard to produce food and acquire the
human capital 
) 2 ( ~
a h  that satisfies (20);
(b) work in their own backyard and undertake an investment which
maximizes (4) subject to (8). 
Since the latter strategy maximizes their lifetime utility, (b) dominates (a). The first
order condition for (b) is, therefore: 
(26) ] 1 [ 1
1
1
) 1 ( δ α β
α − + =
−
+ t a zh .
In this case, the poor instantaneously reach a constant human capital
) 1 /( 1
* ) 1 (














ha , which is the solution to (26).
17 This  * ) 1 (
a h  does not
make the poor entrepreneurs because of Assumption 3.
                                                          
16  We assume that 
−
> h h ) 1 (
0 . Otherwise, the poor would reach the 0 steady-state (see Figure 1),
violating Equation (3). 14
Using the budget constraint (8), it is easy to verify that the optimal
consumption of the poor is:  * ) 1 ( * ) 1 (
a a h zh δ
α
− , which upon substitution into the utility
function (4) yields the value function (25). Q.E.D.
We are now ready to state a proposition for the optimal belt-tightening rule for
the poor:
Proposition 3: There exists a date T* until which it is optimal for the poor to follow
the belt-tightening strategy. 
Proof: If the poor follow such a strategy, a time T comes when their offspring attain
the human capital hmin necessary for them to become entrepreneurs. Until date T, the
poor just consume the subsistence level ω. Beyond T, they consume the saturation
level 
−
a of food and make a transition to the growing manufacturing sector. The value
function associated with such a belt-tightening strategy which makes the poor
entrepreneurs at date T is given by
18: 
(27) ] ln [
1






















From date T onwards, the manufacturing consumption grows at the rate  B β , as per


































where, using the budget constraint (16) and the decision rule (22), the manufacturing
consumption  ) 2 (
mT c  is given by: 
(29) ) ](
) 2 ( ~
min [
) 2 ( ~
min ) 1 ( ) 2 ( B a h h a h h A mT c β δ − − − − + = .
It is straightforward to verify that  E V  is monotonically decreasing in T. 
On the basis of Lemma 2, we observe that the poor will follow the belt-
tightening strategy if  NE E V V ≥ . Since  E V is monotonically decreasing in T, and
NE V is independent of T, there exists a T*, at which  NE E V V = . It is therefore optimal
for the poor to belt-tighten until T*. Q.E.D.
                                                                                                                                                                     
17 To ensure an interior solution, we that assume  * ) 1 ( * ) 1 (





18 Because after time T the poor become entrepreneurs, the cm term in equation (34) has a superscript
(2).15
Figure 2 characterizes T* as the point where the downward sloping  E V
schedule intersects  NE V . If T exceeds T*, the belt-tightening strategy is no longer
optimal for the poor. 
4. Quantitative analysis
In this section we report some quantitative implications of the model and discuss how
they match the data. Our purpose in this exercise is to gain some insights about the
evolution of the distribution of human capital and the path of industrialization of a
representative country based on empirically plausible model parameter values. 
We set the parameters A, β, and δ in such a way that a world average annual
growth rate of 3.76% is reproduced (as in our sample of countries)
19. We then





h  as follows. Based on our dataset, 12% of the
world population had secondary education in the period 1960-65: we therefore set φ ,
the initial proportion of poor in the population, at 0.88. In the next step, using the






equal to 11. We then choose a value of 
 
) 1 (
0 h  equal to 0.4 with the objective to
replicate the actual time path of the Gini coefficient in Table 1, and to ensure that the
restrictions set forth in Assumption 1 are not violated.
The other parameter values are fixed as follows:  3 . 0 = α , ω =0.01 and 
−
a=0.1,
These parameter values are chosen so that the simulated human capital stocks do not
become negative, and Assumptions 1 through 4 are not violated. We calculate the
long run Gini coefficient, and the time to industrialize (i.e. T, which is the time at
which the poor acquire hmin) for various values of z around 0.10
20. This is
accomplished by simulating the time path of the human capital of the poor using
equation (24).
21 As soon as the poor acquire hmin, a regime change occurs and from
that time onwards the time path of capital is computed by using (22). 
                                                          
19 More specifically, we set A=0.1; β=0.95; and δ=0.08.
20 This range of values of z is chosen with the objective to replicate the cross-country average Gini
coefficient for our sample. 
21 We also make sure that  ) 1 (
0 h  and hmin satisfy the restrictions set forth in Assumptions 1 through 4.16
The results are summarized in Table 4
22, which reports the long run (i.e.
terminal) Gini coefficient and the time to industrialize for the poor (i.e. T). Both time
to industrialize and inequality are lower for economies with higher agricultural
productivity, z, and very sensitive to the z values. For instance, a change in z from
0.09 to 0.12 makes the Gini coefficient drop from 0.32 to 0.19, and the time to
industrialize decrease from 48 to 33 years. Countries with higher agricultural
productivity industrialize therefore faster and have lower inequality. This is consistent
with the negative cross-country correlations between agricultural productivity and the
terminal Gini coefficient, and between agricultural productivity and the share of
agriculture shown in Table 3.
23
Table 5 repeats the same computational experiment when hmin is higher. A
higher hmin means a higher initial inequality (see Assumption 2). We can see that both
the long run Gini coefficient and the time to industrialize are higher when the initial
distribution of human capital is less favorable to the poor. Furthermore, as in Table 4,
both time to industrialize and inequality are lower for economies with higher
agricultural productivity. These findings suggest that countries with a higher initial
inequality end up having a higher long run inequality: inequality is therefore a
persistent process and the persistence is higher for low agricultural productive
countries, as shown in Tables 2 and 3.
Figure 3 plots the transitional paths of the Gini coefficient for z=0.1 and
hmin=11. Staring from 0.41, there is a sharp decline in the Gini coefficient to a level
around 0.22 during a fifty year course of industrialization. This decline in inequality
over time is consistent with the stylized facts reported in Table 1.
24 
The overall picture that emerges from the quantitative analysis of the model
agrees with the data. Countries generally show a decrease in inequality. However,
                                                          
22 The issue arises whether it is always optimal for the poor to belt-tighten for these calibrated range of
parameters. To answer this question, we have also calculated the optimal belt-tightening period T* as
shown in Figure 2. We found that T* is always higher than the time to industrialize (T) reported in
Tables 4 and 5. This means that the belt-tightening strategy is indeed optimal for the poor.
23 This relationship between agricultural productivity and industrialization is also very consistent with
Gollin et. al. (2002) and Hansen and Prescott (1999). 
24 During the intermediate phase (from year 25 onward), we observe a slight increase in the Gini
coefficient until it stabilizes at its long run level. This can be explained as follows. Due to diminishing
returns to agriculture, initially, the poor grow significantly faster than the rich and that is why the Gini
coefficient shows a decline over time. As the knowledge gap between the rich and poor narrows, the
poor grow at a slower rate, and this explains why the Gini coefficient shows a slight increase as the
time to industrialize approaches. This slight reversal in the Gini coefficient is also consistent with the
data: countries with low initial inequality generally show a very small increase in inequality over time.
We do not report these results for brevity. 17
countries setting off with a higher initial inequality experience a higher long run
inequality, and take longer to industrialize. In addition, for countries with low
agricultural productivity, this phenomenon of higher long run inequality and slower
pace of industrialization becomes more pronounced. A combination of initial
inequality and low productivity of agriculture thus explains why some countries
industrialize late and why their within-country inequality persists in the long run. 
5. Conclusion
This paper has attempted to analyze the relationship between industrialization and
within country inequality. In addition to agricultural productivity, we have highlighted
the role of the initial distribution of human capital as a critical determinant of the time
path of industrialization of a country and of the resulting evolution of within country
inequality. Countries starting off the process of industrialization with an uneven
distribution of human capital, and low agricultural productivity industrialize late.
However, in those countries, the poor grow rapidly because they find it optimal to
tighten their belts in order to augment their human capital and become entrepreneurs
in the future. In the process, the knowledge inequality declines. However, despite this
reduction in inequality, the latter continues to persist in the long run because of initial
conditions. Such a persistent knowledge inequality can be seen as a consequence of
failing credit markets. A public policy implication is that in the presence of such
market failures, the government may provide corrective educational subsidies to the
poor to narrow the knowledge gap. 18
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Appendix 2: Credit markets
We outline here a simple model of imperfect credit markets, which deter the poor
from obtaining finance. The model draws on Galore and Zeira (1993). International
creditors are unable to distinguish between bad and good borrowers, and therefore,
incur a fixed monitoring cost M. Let rb denote the borrowing rate for the poor who19
borrow  b, and r* denote the world interest rate. The zero profit condition of the
creditors implies:
(A.1) M b r b rb + = *.
If the borrower runs away with the loan, the cost of evasion is κM (where
κ>1), which is proportional to the monitoring cost. Banks set the borrowing level and
the borrowing rate in such a way that this evasion is not incentive compatible, which
yields:
(A.2) M r b b κ = + ) 1 (.
Using (A.1) and (A.2), one can easily determine the borrowing rate and the optimal

























In other words, the borrowing rate exceeds the world interest rate, r*. As κ approaches
infinity, the borrowing rate approaches r* and the loan size approaches infinity. 
To become an entrepreneur, one needs the basic skill hmin. Let the schooling
cost necessary to attain this basic skill be λ.hmin, where λ>1. If b* < λ.hmin, borrowers
do not obtain financing. We assume that our model is characterized by such a scenario
of imperfect credit markets. 
Appendix 3: Derivation of Equation (19)
The solution of Equation (18) consists of two parts: the solution for the non-
homogenous part (particular integral); and the solution for the homogenous part
(complementary solution). 
We initially conjecture a solution:
(A.5) Q ht =
) 2 (  for all t .








which solves the particular integral part. 
The homogenous part of (19) is given by: 
(A.7) 0 ) 1 (
) 2 ( 2 ) 2 (
1
) 2 (
2 = + + − + + t t t h B h B h β β .20















− + ± +
= .
The general solution, which is the sum of the solutions for the non-homogenous and
homogenous parts, is thus given by (19). Q.E.D. 
Appendix 4: Derivation of the Gini coefficient
    1
Proportion of  C
           Human Capital
                               B
        ν
A φ 1
D
  Proportion of People
In the diagram above, the Gini coefficient, also known as the Lorenz ratio, is given by
the area ABC/ACD. It is straightforward to verify that the Lorenz ratio is φ-v, where 
(A.9)
) 2 (
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0.32 0.27 0.25 0.23 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.17
Note: The human capital Gini coefficient represents the human capital inequality in the population aged
15 and over. The average share of agriculture represents the share of the value added coming from
agriculture to GDP, and is taken from the World Bank Development Indicators (2002).24
















Notes:  Gini15  represents the human capital Gini coefficient in the population aged 15 and over.
LOWAGRPRODi  is a dummy variable equal to one for those countries with average agricultural
productivity in the bottom quartile of the distribution. Time dummies were included in all the
specifications. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard errors and test statistics are
asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. All left-hand side variables were instrumented using two
and three lags of those same variables together with time dummies. The Sargan statistic is a test of the
overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. m2 is a test
for second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as
N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. 25
Table 3: Cross-country correlations between inequality, agricultural



























0.761 -0.539 0.883 1.00
Note: The human capital Gini coefficient represents the human capital inequality in the population aged
15 and over. The share of agriculture in GDP represents the share of the value added coming from
agriculture to GDP, and is taken from the World Bank Development Indicators (2002). Agricultural
productivity is given by the agriculture value added per worker and is also taken from the World Bank
Development Indicators (2002).26
Table 4: Agricultural productivity, inequality, and time to industrialize when
) 1 (
0 min / h h = 11 
z 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.12
Gini
coefficient




48 42 37 33
Source: authors’ calculations. 
Table 5: Agricultural productivity, inequality, and time to industrialize when
) 1 (
0 min / h h = 13 
z 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.12
Gini
coefficient




56 49 43 39
Source: authors’ calculations. 27
Figure 1: Time path of human capital for the poor if they just consume the
subsistence level
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Figure 2: The optimal time to become entrepreneurs
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